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3People draw different conclusions from the a s m  situa­
tions. If a Univarsity of Illinois atudant, sitting on ths 
Quad on a sunny aftarnoon saaa a young man approach a young 
woman and ask har for a data, which sha bluntly declines, 
the observing student and the young voaan sight have two 
different explanations of the situation. The young vonan 
may feel that she was only trying to discourage someone 
whom she had politely refused several tines, while the 
observing student nay conclude that the woman is rude. A 
student who receives an unexpected "A" on an exam might 
claim that she was simply lucky; she had studied the sec­
tion of her class notes that the exan had emphasised by 
chance. Her roonmate, on the other hand, might conclude 
that her intelligent rooaaate had once again demonstrated 
her academic talent.
The phenomenon called the "actor-observer difference" 
is the tendency for people to attribute their own behavior 
to the situation that surrounds them and to attribute the 
behavior of someone else to the other's personality. In 
situations such as psychological therapy the difference in 
attributions could have an important effect. While a ther­
apist might focus on the client's personal characteristics,
«iii ouiiii iifiiv <9«i«v cut nil iiivnwiiinyi« m i m  mi 
attribution prooaas atfaata ao many ftitta of oar lives, 
payehelogists have spent a good deal of tiaa trying to find 
out not only how attributions an different, hat how dif­
ferent factor* affect than.
in this paper, I will focua on how perapectiva affects 
attribution. I shall review hew tha actor-observer hypothe­
sis was first developed and than discuss studies explain 
how visual perspective affsots attributions by actors and 
observers. Finally, in the last section, I shall disousa 
how tin* affects attributions. Three explanations of the 
actor-observer effect are discussed in length. All 
subsequent research discussed in this review uses on* or 
nors of the three theories to explain data collected.
ferenoe. The original Jones and Harris (1967) study involved 
only observers. Subjects rated actor's true opinions on 
topics which actors had varying anounts of freedom to choose 
the position they defended. The affect of perceived snount 
of ohoioe on observer's inferences about the actors opinion 
was exanined. In the first experiment in this study, 
subjects read essays that they were told were written as
tanswer* to political — ianoe m m . m »  •* ti» eoaaye 
dafansed 0f caatro'a cute, and tha reat fpaaad. Mhjeota 
were told oithor that tho nM]f w tto r oould oh— to t 
pooition to defend or that tho writer had hoot assigned a 
position to do fond, in a aoeond axporl— nt, subjects road 
aaaaya that thay were told had b— n takon fr—  oponint 
atataoonta of dobatos. Again, tho position on Cuba and that 
ths subjsot was told about tha amount of ohoioo tho writer 
had vara aanipulatsd. In a third experinent, subjoota war* 
told that thay vara listening to spa— has on so«ro«atlon 
given by paid sub j sots in a psychology OKporinant who were 
oithor givan frao choica in d—  iding which aids of tha iasuo 
to dofand or wars asaignad a position to advocate.
Bvon whan obsarvora wars told that tha targot had not 
chooon tha side of tha arguaant, — d even whan tho sido 
dafandod was ralativoly unlikely to bo defended, tho oboarv- 
ars uaod tha position argued aa an index of tha target's 
true opinion. In other words, tha subjects attributed tha 
actions of the actors to personal factors, even in a situa­
tion where tha apparent situational factors influencing 
their actions ware constraining. Subjects had bo—  told 
that tha assay writer bean assigned a sido to argue, and 
ware writing for a grads. Evan under those constraints, tha 
subjects who read assays favoring Castro judged tha true
attitude of the writor to bo congruent to tho position 
aosortod in tho assay.
This oxparinsnt was not a diroot study of tho offset of 
actor or observer roles on attributions, but Jones and Nis- 
bett (1971) used its data to support their hypothesis of the 
actor-observer difference. The subjects believed that the 
essays and speeches represented the actors' true opinions, 
when information that the target had no choice in choosing 
which position to defend. Jones and Nisbett believed that 
this demonstrates the observers' tendencies to make disposi­
tional attributions.
The original actor-observer difference study. In a 
series of three experiments, Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and 
Merecek (1973) produced the actor-observer difference in 
three different situations. The first experiment involved 
actors and observers who made inferences about actors' rea­
sons for volunteering, the secoi. examined attributions for 
choosing a girlfriend and major, and the third required 
actors and observers to describe the target's personality in 
dispositional or situational terms.
College women who believed they were participating in an 
experiment on decision making were asked to make a "real" 
decision before the experiment began. The actor subject and 
two confederates were then asked to volunteer, for a small 
wage, to host the wives of financial backers of a program
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that researched ways to assist ths underprivileged and 
ninority groups. Both of the confederates always volun­
teered, and the actor subject was always asked after the two 
confederates had been asked. Actors and observers were then 
asked to make attributions for the actors willingness to 
volunteer (in the trials where the actc * did not volunteer, 
observers were questioned about one of the confederates) and 
to predict the degree to which the actor would be likely to 
canvass for the United Fund. Although the amoxmt of money 
offered did have an effect on the actor's willingnesc to 
volunteer, answers to questions asked following the exper­
iment indicated that neither actors nor observers considered 
the money to be an important factor in determining the deci­
sion to volunteer. Observers were more likely to predict 
that volunteers would canvass for United Fund.
In the second experiment in the Nisbett et al. study, 
male undergraduates were asked to write six short para­
graphs. In the first two paragraphs, the subject described 
why he dated the woman he dated most frequently and why he 
had chosen his major. Subjects described why their fc^ st 
friends had chosen their majors and girlfriends in the next 
two paragraphs. Lastly, subjects were asked to write para­
graphs as if they were their best friend describing the 
subject's choice of major and girlfriend. The responses in
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the paragraphs ware than coded as, entity (situational), 
dispositional or entity/dispositional reasons.
The actors gave roughly twice as many entity reasons as 
dispositional reasons for choosing their girlfriend. When 
explaining choice of major, the observers were more likely 
to explain the choice in terms of the target's disposition. 
In the final part of this study, subjects described their 
own personality, as well as the personalities of four other 
targets, by indicating which of three choices most accu­
rately described the target person, on 20 trials. A trait, 
its polar opposite and the phrase "depends on the situation" 
were the available choices. The measure of attributional 
tendency was the number of trait descriptions chosen for 
each target. This technique revealed a difference between 
the actors and observers in number of trait descriptions 
used to describe the target.
Jones and Nisbett's explanations. In a 1971 review, 
Jones and Nisbett proposed three explanations of the actor- 
observer difference. The first explanation, the difference 
in information available to the actor and observer, assumes 
that actors have more available information on which to base 
their judgments. Secondly, Jones and Nisbett suggested the 
information processes of actors may be different from those 
of observers. Finally, there are possible motivational rea­
sons for actors to attribute their actions to the situation.
8
Jonas and Nisbstt discusssd cited cause data, effect data, 
and historical data as typas of information on which actors 
and observers may have different amounts of information. 
They argued that only with cause data, information about the 
causes leading to the observed behavior, can observer's 
knowledge approach the knowledge of actors. While noting 
that actors and observers could have nearly equal informa** 
tion, they argued that actors usually have more information 
about the circumstances surrounding the actions of the 
actor. For example, if Gina trips Joel «.nd Jan observes the 
encounter, Gina may know that Joel had committed a series of 
unprovoked assaults against her, and that she tripped him 
for this reason while Jan does not have this information. 
Gina will attribute her actions to the situation (Joel's 
assault), while Jan attributes Gina's actions to her per­
sonal tendency to be hateful.
Effect data include information about what was done, the 
outcomes of the action, and the actor's emotional reactions 
to the situation. Jones and Nisbstt note that actors and 
observers can have equal information on the action and out­
comes of the situation (Gina tripped Joel and Joel became 
angry), but that the only information that observers have on 
the actor's reaction to the situation is information 
obtained indirectly. Observers can base their attributions 
on how they would have reacted in the same situation, or on
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inferences they make from the actor's verbalizations and 
paralinguistic cues.
Finally, Jonas and Nisbott point out that observers may 
base their attributions partly on their assumptions about 
people in general, while actors have access to their partic­
ular life history. Jones and Nisbett suggest differences in 
these three types of information night lead to the nora 
situational attributions nade by actors, but differences in 
available information could also lead to nore dispositional 
attributions by actors (Monson and Snyder 1977).
Jones and Nisbett discuss Motivational influences 
affecting actor as a second explanation of the actor- 
observer difference. They hypothesize that reactance, 
Brehn's (1966) theory of hunan response to threatened free­
doms, influences the actor-observer difference. According 
to this hypothesis, "The perception of freedom is probably 
best maintained by simultaneously ascribing traits to others 
and denying them in oneself (Jones and Nisbett, 1971, 
p.92). In other words, ascribing traits to others makes 
observers feel that they can predict other's behavior while 
others cannot predict their behavior, because they cannot be 
described by trait descriptions (their behavior depends on 
the situation). According to this explanation, the actor- 
observer difference allows subjects to feel more free. 
However, it is not clear that the need to be "free" would
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lead actors to situational attributions. If ona's bshavior 
is determined bv ths situation rathsr than personal disposi­
tion, are they really "free"?
A second type of motivational influence is "the motive 
to maintain or enhance one's self esteem" (Jones and Nis- 
bett, 1971, p.92). If actors consider the actions about 
which attributions are being undesirable, they will attrib­
ute their behavior to the situation, and if the behavior is 
considered desirable, actors will attribute their behavior 
their personal dispositions. The observer will make dispo­
sitional attributions for desirable behavior if the observer 
already has a favorable opinion of the actor, and the 
observer will make situational attributions for undesirable 
behavior if the observer has a negative opinion of the 
actor. The authors note that the actor-observer difference 
is probably not completely the result of motivational fac­
tors since there are a variety of motivational factors that 
could be influential that predict opposite results.
Finally, differences in information processing could affect 
attributions made by actors and observers. Jones and Nis- 
bett (1971) assert that the actions of the actor, in con­
trast to the features of the relatively stable environment, 
are more dynamic and therefore more salient to the observer. 
The actor's position is not advantageous to observing his or 
her behavior. Visually, the observer is in a much better
11
position to obssrvs the actor's bshavior. Ths actor's 
attention is usually directed outward towards the surround­
ing situational elements to which the actor reacts. Addi­
tionally, actors are usually focusing on aspects of the 
situations (i.e. other people) rather than concentrating 
their mental energy on their personal disposition. There­
fore, the observer processes more information about the 
actor, while the actor processes more information about the 
environment.
The Effect of Visual Perspective on Attributions 
In Hanet's masterpiece, "A Bar at the Folies Ber­
gers" (see Appendix 1), show how visual perspective can alter 
attributions people make for other's behavior. When looking 
at the young barmaid full-face, one might assume that her 
expression reflects boredom or fatigue that. The same 
painting allows a different perspective. Looking at the 
reflection in the mirror, one discovers that the barmaid is 
looking into the stern face of a man. This new visual 
information may lead to different attributions for the 
woman's facial expressions: perhaps the man is a causal 
agent in the woman's mood.
Several experiments have attempted to alter perspective 
various ways to study the effects on attributions.
The Storms Experiment
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In an innovative experiment, Storms (1973) changed the 
visual perspective of actors who performed a "getting- 
acquainted" task and observer subjects who watched the 
interaction. The task involved only actor subjects who were 
introduced to another subject and instructed to spend a few 
minutes getting to know each other. Each interaction was 
observed by two subjects who had been assigned to observe 
one of the actors. By videotaping the conversations from 
two different camera angles, Storms provided four experimen­
tal treatments. The actor-same and observer-same subjects 
viewed a videotape that was filmed from their original point 
of view. The observer-new subjects saw a videotape of the 
person whom they were not originally instructed to observe. 
The actor-new subjects saw a tape made from the point of 
view of the person with whom they had interacted. In a con­
trol condition no videotape was shown, and the subject was 
asked only to fill out questionnaires following the taping 
of the interaction.
Storms reproduced the actor-observer difference in the 
actor-same and observer-same conditions. The actor-observer 
effect was reversed in the actor-new and observer-new condi­
tions. The actors were more situational in their evalua­
tions in the original point of view and the control condi­
tions, but in the video reorientation condition, they were 
relatively more dispositional. The observers, who were more
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dispositional in ths sass oriantation and control condi­
tions, wars more situational in tha raoriantation condition.
storms discussad the two diffarancas batwaan actors and 
observers in tarns of tha Jonas and Misbett hypotheses. 
First, Storm's considered a difference in information avail­
able to actors and observers, focusing on effect data, that 
is, data about the event itself. With affect data, Jonas 
and Nisbett argue actors and observers can hava "equivalent 
information about tha nature of the act and about environ­
mental outcomes." (Jones and Misbett 1971, p.84). Storms 
also considered Jones and Nisbett theory that there are dif­
farancas in tha way tha information is processed. Storms 
combined these two hypotheses as a "point of view" or "per­
spective" explanation, to explain his results. Storms 
argues that visual information influences which aspects of 
the situation are salient and therefore affects how the 
information is processed and how attributions are made.
This study demonstrated that some of the conditions 
Jones and Nisbett hypothesised lead to differences in attri­
butions were not necessary to produce the actor-observer 
difference. What about the cause data and the historical 
data? According to Jones and Nisbett, the difference in 
attributions made by actors and observers is partially caused 
by observer's informations deficits in thsse types of date. 
Storms' results are not in accordance with Jones and Nisbett.
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He reverses the actor observer effect by reversing only the 
visual information available to the actor and observer, while 
the cause and historical data are not manipulated. 
Additionally, Jones and Nisbett's hypothesis of a difference 
in information processing is fundamentally different from 
Storm's. While Storms discusses visual salience as the cause 
of processing differences, Jones and Nisbett discuss 
information processing as a much more cognitive entity and 
include arguments about "egocentric biases". Storms' 
experiment supports his perspective hypothesis, but not the 
more cognitive hypothesis of Jones and Nisbett in explaining 
the different attributional patterns of actors and observsrs. 
Storms was able to manipulate attributions made by actors and 
observers using only the visual reorientation. Therefore, it 
might be concluded that the actor observer difference is not 
the result of informational deficits and egocentric biases, 
but is the result of differences in perspective.
The Regan and Totten Reply
Regan and Totten (1975) attempted to reverse the actor- 
observer difference without manipulating the visual informa­
tion available to either the actor or the observer. The 
experiment involved only observers, observers that they 
attempted to turn into actors.
Regan and Totten (1975) showed 40 subjects a video tape 
of two students involved in a "getting acquainted task."
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While half of tha subjacta vara given standard "obsarvar" 
Instructions [such as thosa usad by Jonas and Nisbatt (1971)] 
for obsarving tha assigned target, half racaivad instructions 
nodalad after Stotland's (1969) "imagine him" instructions. 
Tha aapathic "imagine him " instructions vara as follows:
While you are watching this "gat acquainted" conversa­
tion, please try to empathise with Margret, tha girl on tha 
left side of tha screen. Imagine how Margret feels as she 
engages in tha conversation. While you are watching tha 
tape, picture to yourself just how she feels in the 
situation. You are to concentrated on the way she feels 
while conversing. Think about her reaction to the 
information she is receiving from tha conversation. In your 
mind's eye, you are to visualise how it feels to Margret to 
be in this conversation. After the tape is over, you will be 
asked about Margret's behavior.
(Regan and Totten, 1975, p. 852-853)
Half of the subjects saw a standard videotape and 
half saw a tape in which only the target person was shown, 
although both participants could be heard. The videotape 
manipulation cross-cut the instruction manipulation, so 
four cells were created. Subjects were asked to make 
situational and dispositional attributions for four 
behaviors. The experimenters predicted that the empathic 
observers would provide more situational attributions than 
the normal observers, because they would utilize a 
cognitive set more like that of actors. Regan and Totten 
included the videotape manipulation to determine whether 
the empathic instructions were simply directing the 
subject's visual attention toward the other participant.
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They did not want the observers to simply adopted the 
visual perspective of the actor subjects in Jones and 
Nisbett (1971) study. Therefore, an effect in the cell 
where empathic observers could see only the target subject 
would support their theory that the actor observer effect 
is influenced by the way the information is processed.
The empathic observers were more situational in their 
attributions for the target's behavior than the standard 
observers. A closer investigation of the results does pre­
sent some difficulty for the Regan and Totten theory. The 
effect of empathic instructions was not significant in the 
two-person, standard video-tape condition. The effect was 
significant in the one-person videotape condition. Regan 
and Totten (1975) do not even mention this effect of visual 
perspective on attributions. The empathic instructions 
manipulation did not produce significance in the standard 
videotape condition. Further investigation into how the 
visual orientation affects attributions is needed because 
cells in which the videotape manipulation was used were the 
only ones that yielded significant results. Finally, a 
check for subject's perception of the empathic instructions 
should have been made. Because the subjects had no previous 
experience with Margret, trying to empathize with her was 
probably based on past similar experiences of their own. It 
is important to know whether subjects really responded to
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the instructions by imagining that they were Margret, or 
whether, because of lack of information about Margret, they 
responded to the questionnaires as they would respond if 
they were Margret. If subjects answered the questionnaires 
as they would respond if they were Margret, they would pic­
ture themselves in the situation Margret was in and respond 
as they would in that situation, as an actor. Subjects who 
imagined themselves as Margret provide valid data for Regan 
and Totten's hypothesis, but subjects responding as them­
selves in the situation Margret is in do not. Therefore, 
the Regan and Totten experiment does not diminish the pos­
sible importance of the effect of visual perspective in the 
attributions that subjects make in the "getting acquainted" 
exercise.
The effects of visual perspective generalize to more 
important everyday situations. Studies of causality, such 
as Lassiter and Irvine (1986) (see also Taylor, Crocker, 
Fiske, Springer, and Winbler, 1979, and Taylor and Fiske, 
1975) have shown how the point of view from which a videot­
ape is filmed affects people's causa1 attributions. Las­
siter and Irvine (1986) found that visual perspective had a 
significant effect on subject's attributions for a confes­
sion to a crime. Those subjects who saw the back of the sus­
pect and the front of the detective were most likely to 
explain the confession as coercion by the detective. Sub­
18
jects who saw the front of the suspect and the back of the 
detective were least likely to accept the confession as 
resulting from the disposition of the suspect. Because it 
is becoming more common for videotaped confessions to be 
shown to jurors, this experiment shows how video camera 
angles could seriously effect jury decisions.
The Effect of Time on Attributions 
During my first year of high school, I won the part of 
the romantic lead in the fall play. Opening night was full 
of anticipation and excitement. All was well until it was 
time for the kiss. Because the young man who had the part 
of my beau, Alan, was my best friend's older brother, and my 
best friend was also in the play, he had never actually 
kissed me. This added to the butterflies that I already had. 
The kiss was staged on a flight of stairs and involved a 
dip. I spoke my last line, Alan tried to dip me, but I lost 
my balance and fell down the stairs. I blamed the fall on 
everything from the shoes that I was wearing to the carpet­
ing on the stairs, but never on myself. As time went by, I 
realized that most likely I fell down the stairs due to my 
nervousness and lack of grace. As time went by, the way I 
viewed the incident changed.
This is often the case. Passage of time is another way 
to change the perspective of actor and observers. Many
19
attempts have bean mads to find consistencies in the way 
that dispositional and situational attributions stabilize or 
alter as time passes, but the results have been quite disap­
pointing. Moore, Sherrod, Lui, and Underwood (1979) found 
that actors' attributions became more dispositional over 
time. Miller and Porter (1980) found that situational fac­
tors became more important to actors as time passed. Funder 
and Van Ness (1983) attempted to explain the conflicting 
results as the result of comparing a repeated measures 
design with an independent groups design; they found that 
only in the independent groups design did any difference 
over time occur at all. Burger and Huntzinger (1985) and 
Burger (1983) explored the effects of success on explana­
tions by actors and observers over time. Attributions 
changed over time as a function of perceived amount of suc­
cess.
The Moore et al. study. Actors made three minute tapes 
describing themselves that they were told would be inter­
preted by students at another college. Half of the subjects 
filled out questionnaires similar to those used in Storms' 
1973 experiment that inquired about perceived level of 
friendliness, nervousness, talkativeness, and assertiveness. 
In addition, dispositional and situational attributions for 
these four behaviors were reported by subjects on the ques­
tionnaires. The other half of the subjects returned approx-
20
imately three weeks latar and filled out tha saaa question­
naires.
A saall tendency was found for actors to become more 
dispositional in their attributions over time, for three of 
the four behaviors. Because the behavior that did not show 
a significance effect can be considered negative (nervous­
ness) , the experimenters suggested that the shift might be a 
motivational one. Actors attribute favorable actions to 
their consistent traits over time. No favorability ratings 
were obtained on the behaviors, so it is not possible to 
evaluate this hypothesis with these data. Perhaps asser­
tiveness or talkativeness were not considered highly favor­
able traits by these subjects. The experimenters noted that 
the data from this experiment did not strongly support their 
hypothesis. They moved on to study the dispositional shift 
in another context.
Subjects were involved in a "getting acquainted" exer­
cise, in groups of four. Two actors were randomly assigned 
to engage in a five minute conversation, and each was 
observed by an observer subject. The attribution question­
naires were the same as those used in the first experiment. 
A group of control subjects (N-48) was divided into three 
groups, and each group was assigned a recall set prior to 
the administration of the questionnaire. One group was 
instructed to remember responses of the target and how those
21
responses were probably viewed by the other actor (Disposi­
tional Recall). Another group was asked to focus on aspects 
of the situation (Situational Recall), and the third group 
was not instructed to focus on any particular aspect (Neu­
tral Recall). These subjects were then released from the 
experiment. All of the other subjects filled out the attri­
bution questionnaire and left. Three weeks later, the 72 
subjects in the experimental group returned to the lab, and 
were divided into the same groups as the control subjects. 
Following the recall manipulation, subjects filled out 
attribution questionnaire and were released from the exper­
iment. The second experiment provided evidence that the 
hypothesized positivity bias (motivational explanation) did 
not affect attributions over time, because all subjects 
rated the actors as less friendly after time had passed and 
actors rated themselves as less assertive. Again, the 
actors became more situational over time while the observers 
remained relatively stable. Finally, while actors had no 
trouble recall' ig dispositional details, they did have some 
trouble remembering details about the situation.
Although the experimenters concluded that people's self 
perception may be "an artifact of information processing 
over time" (p. 568), Funder (1983, p.20) points out that the 
results of Moore et al. did not fully support this conclu­
sion, because the results did not reveal any relationship
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between the decrease in situational attributions and memory 
for situational details.
___ Miller and Porter's conflicting results. Miller and
Porter examined how attributions change over time by con­
ducting four experiments that investigated subjects' induc­
tions from outcomes of different events. Present and past 
parent/child arguments, an anagrams test, the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game, and two person debates were the situations for 
the study. Miller and Porter concluded that actors' attri­
butions get more situational as time passes and that the 
differences between actors' and observers' attributions nar­
row as the amount of time between the event and the judgment 
increases.
In the study of parent/child arguments, half of the 
subjects listed the most common arguments they currently 
have with their parents and rated the amount of responsibil­
ity that they attribute to themselves and to their parents 
for the arguments. Subjects also were asked to judge how 
typical the arguments were of other people their age and 
their parents and how inevitable the arguments were. The 
remainder of the subjects reported the same things for argu­
ments that had occurred when they were 16. Subjects felt 
the responsibility for the arguments was equal in both con­
ditions, but that both parents and children were less
23
responsible and the arguments were more typical and more 
inevitable in the past.
More direct information about attributions over time 
was gathered in the second experiment, in which menstruating 
women received feedback on their performance on an anagrams 
exam. After completing the task and receiving their scores, 
half of the subjects used seven-point scales to indicate the 
degree to which luck, ability, and effort had determined 
their performance. Questions also asked subjects about the 
role of their period in determining their score, as well as 
how similar they thought their performance would be to other 
menstruating women and how they would perform on future 
tasks. The other half of the subjects completed the same 
questionnaire 7-10 days after the task.
The only two factors that differed over time were task 
difficulty and role that the subject's period had in deter­
mining performance. In each case, the factor was accorded 
more responsibility in the delayed condition. Were Miller 
and Porter correct in inferring that the subjects viewed 
their behavior as the consequence of less personal factors 
as time passed? One important result that is not discussed 
by the experimenters is that the dispositional attributions 
(effort and ability importance) showed high ratings in both 
conditions. Although the highest rating (on a seven point 
scale) in the delayed condition was given to the role of the
24
test (4.06), it does not seen to differ significantly fron 
the ratings of effort (3.83) or ability (3.94). The experi­
menters did not report whether or not the factors were sig­
nificantly different'
In the third study, actors and observers nade attribu­
tions for the results of trials of the Prisoner's Dilamina 
game. Only one actor/observer pair was involved in each 
trial, and the responses of the other competitor were given 
by the experimenter. Each actor and observer was placed in 
an experimental room alone, with an intercom through which 
they could speak to the experimenter, but not to each other. 
The experimenter could communicate with both subjects. The 
actor reported his responses to the experimenter and received 
the responses of the other player from the experimenter 
through the intercom. The observer heard the responses of 
both players from the experimenter through the intercom. All 
subjects were given a sheet to record all responses of both 
players. The first response of the nonexistent player was 
randomly assigned and after that, the experimenter reported 
the second player's response as the N-l response of the 
actor. After 30 trials, half of the actors and observers 
filled out questionnaires which asked them to rate how much 
interaction between the players and the situation had 
determined the outcome of the game. The remaining subjects 
filled out the same questionnaire half an hour later.
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Differences were found between the amount of responsi­
bility attributed to the two players and the situation by 
actors and observers in the immediate condition. While 
actors attributed more responsibility to the players, 
observers attributed more responsibility to the situation. 
The situation was viewed as less causal by all subjects in 
the immediate condition. No significant difference was 
found between actors and observers in their attributions in 
the delayed condition.
The final study required subjects to debate an assigned 
position on capital punishment. Following the debate, sub­
jects were told that they would debate again with another 
partner in the second session or that they would analyze the 
debates of others. Half of the subjects then filled out 
questionnaires asking them to indicate the amount of influ­
ence their ability, effort and preparation, and the side of 
the issue that they argued had in determining their behav­
ior. When the subjects in the delayed condition arrived 
approximately a week later, they were reminded of the task 
they had been assigned and were then given the same ques­
tionnaire as the other subjects.
Subjects did not differ significantly in the amount of 
importance they assigned to ability in any of the four con­
ditions. Those subjects who did not expect to debate again 
assigned more importance to the side of the issue argued and
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less importance to their preparation and effort than did 
those who expected to debate again. For those who did not 
expect to debate again, the issue was given a higher impor­
tance rating in the delayed condition and effort and prepa­
ration were emphasized less in the no delay condition. No 
effects of delay were found for subjects who expected to 
debate again. The experimenters concluded thut when motiva­
tion is kept high by indicating that another debate will 
follow, the attributions are more like those made originally 
in the no delay condition.
Miller and Porter (1980) concluded that as time passes, 
the attributions of actors become more like the attributions 
of observers, because the motivation to see oneself as in 
control of the situation decreases over time.
_ .The effect of memory on attributions over time. Funder 
and Van Ness involved subjects in a "getting acquainted" 
exercise like the one used by Moore et al. (1979), but added 
a few new twists. To judge whether or not attributions 
became more accurate over time due to subject's increased 
ability to unde:jtand events (Miller and Porter (1980), the 
experimenters introduced agreement ratings of the actual 
behaviors as an indirect measure of the accuracy of the 
behavior. Inter-rater agreement scores were obtained from 
behavior ratings of the actor, observer, and two experiment­
ers for each actor/observer pair. Because one of the Moore
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et al. (1979) experiments had used a repeated assessment,
and the Miller and Porter study (1980) used independent 
groups, Funder and Van Ness used both designs. The subjects 
in the repeated assessments group filled out a questionnaire 
that asked them to rate how friendly, nervous, talkative, 
and assertive they were. Subjects were also asked to choose 
a scale value for how important characteristics of the situ­
ation and personal characteristics were for causing them to 
act the way they did, for each of the four behaviors. All 
subjects returned three weeks later and filled out the 
attribution questionnaire, the repeated assessment group for 
the second time and the postponed assessment group for the 
first time.
Surprisingly, no difference between actors and observ­
ers was found in the attributions made. The subjects in the 
postponed assessment group became more situational and less 
dispositional over time, while the repeated measures group 
tended to be relatively less situational. The experimenters 
concluded that attributions are less reliable as time goes 
by. Although this study did not find an actor observer dif­
ference, it does tell us something about design influences. 
In addition, experimenters may learn something from the task 
that was given to the subjects. It is possible that the 
five minute conversation was not very memorable, and that 
could account for the subject's inability to remember
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aspects of the situation over a period of three weeks. Per­
haps a more memorable or longer interaction would increase 
the memory for events. The experiment does not provide 
enough evidence to conclude that changes in peoples' attri­
butions over time are always based on loss of poor memory 
for the event.
Time and task outcome. Another possible explanation 
for a difference in attributions over time is task outcome. 
Burger and Huntsinger (1984) found that subjects who were 
successful on a skills-assessment test made more disposi­
tional attributions over time, while the less successful 
made more situational attributions. Burger (1985) found 
similar results for subjects who made attributions for per­
formance on a midterm. He concluded that the difference in 
attributions was due to self-serving biases, but this expla­
nation fails to explain why the actor-observer difference 
and changes in attributions over time occur when there the 
task does not involve success or failure, as in a "getting 
acquainted" activity.
Another look at attributions over time. Although the 
research on changes in attributions over time has been 
inconclusive, another attempt was made to demonstrate how 
perspective, as a function of time, affects attributions. In 
addition to asking subjects to make judgements about past
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behaviors, subjects were asked about future behavior. The 
future should have the sane effect on perspective as the 
past. As actors look ahead, they probably adopt an observer­
like perspective, similar to the perspective they adopt when 
rating past experiences.
For each of twenty pairs of traits, subjects described 
the target by choosing a point on a continuum between the 
polar-opposite traits, or by choosing a "depends on the 
situation" option. Subjects were asked to rate themselves 
and a close friend with each of three focuses: present, 
three years past, and five years ahead.
The change of focus, whether to the past or to the 
future, should lead to more dispositional attributions by 
both actors and observers. Actors have the opportunity to 
distance themselves from the situation and look at how they 
affected or will affect the interaction. As observers think 
about the past or future, the actor, who is the most salient 
feature of interactions in the present, becomes even more 
salient, especially in comparison to the less striking fea­
tures of the environment.
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Method
Eighty-three University of Illinois undergraduates, 44 
females and 39 males, who were enrolled in an introductory
psychology class participated in a study as part of a class 
requirement. Similar to a study performed by Nisbett et 
al. (1973), subjects were asked to describe themselves and 
their closest friend that they had known for more than 
three years using a series of questionnaires. For each 
questionnaire, the subject was asked to describe the target 
by either circling a number between a pair of polar- 
opposite traits for each of twenty trait pairs, or circling 
a "D" to indicate that the subject could be better 
described by the phrase "depends on the situation" than by 
any point on the continuum. The "depends on the situation" 
option was placed to the left of the continuum for each 
trait pair. The subject described each target in each of 
three time frames or focuses. Subjects described the 
target as they were at the time the questionnaires were 
answered, as they were three years in the past, and as the 
subject thought they would be five years in the future. 
The questionnaires were presented to each subject in a 
random order to control for order effects. The twenty 
traits used were the same as those used in the Nisbett et 
al.(1973) study with the exception of the "serious-gay" 
pair. Due to current usage of the word "gay", the pair was 
replaced with "serious-fun-loving", as it was in a later
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study by Funder (1980). For a full list of traits# see the 
appendix.
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Results
As expected# actors were more dispositional than 
observers (F-10.73# df 1# p<.002). This finding repli­
cates the actor-observer difference found in previous 
research. However# temporal focus also affected attribu­
tions (F-11.90, df 1, pc.002). Although both actors and 
observers were more dispositional in the past and the 
future, when you compare the attributions of actors in 
different time frames to the attributions of actors and 
observers in the present (see table one) # they seem very 
similar. Specifically# table two shows that the mean dif­
ference between actors and observers in the present 
(t*2• 28# df 82# pc.025) is about the same as the differ­
ences between actors in present and three years ago 
(t*3• 39# df 82# pc.001)# and actors in the present and 
five years in the future (t*1.67 df 82 pc.099). When the 
means are studied in this way# the effect of focus on 
attributions looks like the actor observer effect. It is 
clear that more than temporal focus is responsible for 
producing the actor-observer effect; there was no interac-
Table 1
Mean Numbers of Trait Used to Describe Target with Each Focus
Focus
Target Past Present Future Mean
Actors 18.86 18.14 18.49 18.50
Observers 19.30 18.66 18.88 18.69
Mean 19.08 18.40 18.69
Table 2
Mean Differences Between Target by Focus Cells
Target 
by Focus
Actor observer
Past Present Future Past Present Future
Actor
Past
Present .71***
Future .36* .35*
Observer
Past .45** 1.16*** .81***
Present .19 .52** .17 .64***
Future CMO• .73*** .3t** .42** .27
*£<.10. **£<.05. ***£<.001.
tion between the actor-observer effect and the focus 
effect (F-.15, df 2, p<.860).
Discussion
The main hypothesis of this study, that actors using 
a time frame other than the present will make more dispo­
sitional attributions, is supported. This adds support to 
the theory that the divergent attributions made by actors 
and observers are the result of their different perspec­
tives.
Change in perspective allows the actor the chance to 
see how personality affects his or her behavior. Because 
neither actors nor observers have information about the 
future, it would seem unlikely that the dispositional 
shift in the future condition is the result of differences 
in information. Additionally, no one has memories of the 
future, so this shift does not result from memory bias. 
Furthermore, the attributions made by actors in the past 
and future are similar to those made by observers in the 
present. This indicates that it is possible that when 
actors use a perspective other than the present, they are 
more like observers. Storms' (1973) visual perspective 
change had the same affect that the focus manipulation 
had.
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Although there is no intera tion between target and 
focus, a few interpretations of data that still support 
the main hypothesis are possil e. Perhaps a stronger 
manipulation of altering the perspective of the subjects is 
needed. If subjects had been guided through some 
reflection time before making judgements about the past and 
some projection time before making future judgements, maybe 
information to base these judgements on would have been 
more available. Judging from the very short amount of time 
that many of the subjects used to fill out all of the 
questionnaire, it is possible that some did not take much 
time to think about the target in the instructed time 
period.
While observers are already more distanced from the 
judgements than actors, it seems that the focus effect 
affects them in the same way that it affects actors; that 
is, they become even more distanced. It has been shown 
that the actor was more salient in the present conditions 
(hence more dispositional attributions), and the results 
indicate that the focus manipulation makes the actor even 
more salient to them and leads to judgements that are even 
more dispositional. Because both actors and observers 
become more dispositional, the interaction is not signifi­
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cant.
Thus, it seams that our judgements about our present 
bohavior ara influanoad by tha disadvantageous position 
that wa ara in to obsarva tha whole situation. Zt is dif­
ficult to saa just how such our personal it ias affact how 
wo daal with currant interactions. As wa later reflect on 
tha interaction, or think about future interactions, wa 
ara sore likely to sea our influence on tha environment 
and lass likely to saa tha environments influence on us.
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l Although it ia not posaibla to determine whether or 
not thaaa diffarancaa ara significant from tha raportad 
statistics, it is intarasting to nota that tha smallest 
raportad diffaranca that obtained significance was .43. A 
difference of .22 ( just .01 smaller than the diffaranca 
between 4.06 and 3.94) did not obtain significance.
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Appendix 2: Instructions snd Questionnaire
INSTRUCTIONS
On the following questionnaires, you will be asked to describe yourself or a frieni that you have known for at least six years. You will be asked to describe each person four timesi once for each of four different times in the person's life. For each pair of traits listed, you will be asked to choose a number on a six point continuum that best represents the person's personality. If you feel that the person's positions on the continuum varies according to the situation they are in, you have the option of marking "D", which stands for "depends on the situation".For example, the first pair of traits you are asked to consider is "serious or fun-loving". If you feel the word "serious" better describes the person under consideration, circle one of the three numbers closer to the word "seri­ous". The closer to the word "serious" the number is, the more serious you consider the person to be. If you feel the person can be more accurately described by the "fun-loving", pick one of the three numbers closer to tne word "fun- loving". Again, the closer the number is to the word "fun-loving", the more strongly you feel the word "fun- loving" applies. If you feel the person falls between the two extremes, circle a number close to the center. If you feel a description of the person depends upon the situation they are in at the time, circle "D" for "depends on the situation".Please answer all of the item on each questionnaire in this manner. Thank you.
EXAMPLE!
DEPENDS VERY MODERATELY SOME­ SOME­ MODERATELY VERYON THE MUCH APPLIES WHAT WHAT APPLIES MUCHSITUATION APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES ruN-D SERIOUS 1 2 3 <- 4-> ; 6 LOVING
U m m  d— cribo your— if «  you
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DEPENDSON TNI SITUATION
v m  moderately son. son- MUCH APPLIES WHAT WHATAPPLIES APPLIES APP ES
MODtHATSLY VEXY APPLIES MUCH 
APPLIES
o serious 1 2 3 4 5 • rvN-LOVINO
D SUBJECTIVE
PUTURE- D ORIENTED
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
S
6
S
ANALYTIC
PRESENT*
oriented
D ENEROETIC 1 2 3 4 5 3 RXLAXLO
o unassuming l 2 3 4 3 1 S ELF* ASSENTING
0 LCNIINT l 2 3 4 S 6 rim
0 RESERVED l 2 3 4 5 6 EMOYIOteALLYsxpressive
D DIGNIFIED 1 2 3 4 S 3 CASUAL
D REALISTIC A 2 3 4 3 3 IDEALISTIC
D INTXMSt l 2 3 4 b 3 CALM
D skeptical l 2 3 4 3 3 TRUSTING
0 QUIET X 2 3 * 4 3 3 TALKATIVE
D CULTIVATCS 1 2 3 4 3 3 NATURAL
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DOWDS OM TNI 
SITUATION
VERY MNM1UY SONS' NUCN AFFLXU HRMAmxu
sora-NHATAmiss A m x u
moderatelyA m x u VUYNUCN*m iu
0 SKNS1TXVK 1 3 t TOUON-
StLf •
9 4 NXNDID
0 s u m c x s w r X a 3 4 3 4 SOCIABLE
D STtADY X 2 3 A *• S 4 n n i i u
D DOMINANT 1 2 3 A* s 4 DEFERENTIAL
D CAlfTXOUS 1 2 3 An S 4 SOLO
0 UMXKMXBXTSD 1 2 3 4 * SELF*9 4 CONTROLLED
D COHSCIUfTIOUJ 1 2 3 4 t h a f f y -
*
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?!*•*• d«*cribo ycur frl«nd ii ho or sho it now.
dependsON THE SITUATION
VERYMUCHAPPLIES
MODERATELYAPPLIES SOME**WHATAPPLIES
SOME­WHATAPPLIES
MODERATELYAPPLIES VERYMUCHAPPLIES
D SERIOUS 1 2 3 4 5 4
FUN-LOVING
D subjective i 2 3 4 5 6 ANALYTIC
D FUTURE-ORIENTED 1 2 3 4 3 4
PRESENT­ER! IMTSD
D ENERGETIC 1 2 3 4 5 4 RELAXED
D UNASSUMING 1 2 3 4 3 4
SELF-ASSERTING
D LENIENT 1 2 3 4 3 4 FIRM
D RESERVED 1 2 3 4 3 4
EMOTIONALLYEXPRESSIVE
D DIGNIFIED l 2 3 4 3 4 CASUAL
U REALISTIC 1 2 3 4 3 4 IDEALISTIC
D INTENSE 1 2 3 4 3 4 CALM
D SKEPTICAL 1 2 3 4 3 4 TRUSTING
D QUIET 1 2 3 4 3 4 TALKATIVE
D CULTIVATED I 2 3 4 3 4 NATURAL
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DEPENDS VERYOH THE MUCH SITUATION APPLIES
MODERATELY SOME- APPLIES WHAT APPLIES
SOME­WHATAPPLIES
MODERATELYAPPLIES VERYMUCHAPPLIES
D
D
SENSITIVE
SELF-sumciENT
1
1
2
2
X
X
4
4
5
5
6
€
TOUGH- MINDED
SOCIABLE
D STEADY 1 2 X 4 S 6 FLEXIBLE
D DOMINANT 1 2 X 4 5 4 DEFERENTIAL
D CAUTIOUS X 2 X 4 S 1 BOLD
D UNINHIBITED X 2 X 4 $ < SELF-CONTROLLED
D cowsciiMTioua i 2 X 4 S 1 NAPPY'00-LUCKY
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»!•••• describe jf9BH» *« you wsrs three vssrs .»»■
DEPENDS VERY MODERATELY SONS* SOME* MODERATELY VERY* THK KTUATXON MUCHAPPLIES APPLIES WHATAPPLIES WHATAPPLIES APPLIES MUCHAPPLIES
D SERIOUS 1 2 3 4 5 4
PUN-LOVING
D SUBJECTIVE 1 2 3 A 5 6 ANALYTIC
0 FUTURE-ORIENTED 1 2 3 4 5 4
PRESENT-ORIENTED
D ENERGETIC 1 2 3 4 S 4 RELAXED
0 UNASSUMING X 2 3 4 S 4
SELF-ASSERTING
D LENIENT 1 3 4 S 4 FIRM
D RESERVED X 2 3 4 S 4
EMOTIONALLYEXPRESSIVE
D DIGNIFIED X 2 3 4 S 4 CASUAL
0 REALISTIC X 2 3 4 S 4 IDEALISTIC
D INTtNSI X 2 3 4 S 4 CALM
D SKIRTICAL X 2 3 4 3 4 TRUSTING
D QUEST X 2 3 4 S 4 TALKATIVE
D CULTIVATED X 2 3 4 5 4 NATURAL
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DEPENDS 
DN THE 
3ITUATI ON
VERY MODERATELY SOME- SOME- 
MUCH APPLIES WHAT WHAT 
APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES
MODERATELY
APPLIES
VERY
MUCH
APPLIES
D SENSITIVE X 2 3 4 5 6
TOUGH-
MINDED
SELF-
D surriciENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 SOCIABLE
D STEADY X 2 3 4 5 6 FLEXIBLE
D DOMINANT X 2 3 4 3 6 DEFERENTIAL
D CAUTIOUS X 2 3 4 S 6 BOLD
D UNINHIBITED 1 2 3 4 3 6 SELF-CONTROLLED
D CONSCIENTIOUS 1 2 3 4 S 6 HAPPY-GO-LUCKY
*
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Plc*t« daacribo your frltnd is ho or *h« was shni,.ntrg iff?t
>EPENDS VERY MODERATELY SOME­ SOME­ MODERATELY VERY)N THE MUCH APPLIES WHAT WHAT APPLIES MUCHSITUATION APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES
FUN-
0 SERIOUS 1 2 3 4 5 6 LOVING
D SUBJECTIVE 1 2 3 4 S S ANALYTIC
PUTURE- PRESENT-
0 ORXENTED 1 2 3 4 5 6 ORIENTED
D ENERGETIC 1 2 3 4 S S RELAXED
SELF-D UNASSUMING 1 2 3 4 % S ASSERTING
D LENIENT 1 2 3 4 S S FIRM
EMOTIONALLY
0 RESERVED 1 2 3 4 S 1 EXPRESSIVE
D DIGNIFIED 1 2 3 4 5 S CASUAL
0 REALISTIC 1 2 3 4 5 s IDEALISTIC
L INTENSE 1 2 3 4 S s CALM
D SKEPTICAL 1 2 3 4 S s TRUSTING
D QUIET 1 2 3 4 3 s TALKATIVE
3 6D CULTIVATE) 1 NATURAL
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DEPENDS ON THE 
SITUATION
VERY MODERATELY SOME- SOME- MUCH APPLIES WHAT WHAT APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES
MODERATELY VERY APPLIES MUCH APPLIES
D SENSITIVI 1 2 3 4 S 6 TOUOH-NINDED
self-D sufficient X 2 3 4 S ( SOCIABLE
0 STEADY X 2 3 4 3 1 FLEXIBLE
P DOMINANT 1 2 3 4 S € DEFERENTIAL
D CAUTIOUS X 2 3 4 S S BOLD
D UNINHIBITED X 2 3 4 S 1 SELF*CONTROLLED
D CONSCIENTIOUS 1 2 3 4 S f HARRY-00- LUCKY
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Plttta doceribo vourulf u  you think you will b« flvo v«r« from now.
DEFENDSON TUB SITUATION
VESTMUCHAFFLXES
MODENATELYAFFLXES SOME­WHATAFFLXES
SOME­WHATAFFLXES
MODSEATELYAFFLXES VSHYMUCHAFFLXES
0 SESXOUS 1 2 2 4 S 1
fun-LOVXMO
•
0 SUBJBCTXVt 1 2 3 4 S S ANALYTIC
D futune-ONXENTED 1 2 3 4 S S
FAESEMT-ORIENTED
D emenoetic 1 2 3 4 ft* s HSLAXED
D UNASSUMING 1 2 3 4 S s
SELF*ASSENTING
D LSNXSNT 1 2 3 4 s FINN
D R1SEKVED l 2 3 4 s 1
EMOTIONALLYEXFNESSIVE
D DIGNIFIED 1 2 3 4 s 1 CASUAL
D NEALXSTIC l 2 3 4 3 • IDEALISTIC
D XNTSNSS l 2 3 4 S s CALM
D SKEFTXCAL X 2 3 4 1 TNUSTXNG
D QUIET X 2 3 4 1 1 TALKATIVE
D CULTIVATED 1 2 3 4 5 c NATUSAL
SI
DEPENDSON THt SITUATION
VDN MODERATELY SONS* SONS- MODERATELY VERYMUCH APPLIES WHAT WHAT APPLIES MUCHAPPLIES APPLIES APPLIES APPLIES
TOUQH*
D SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 MINDED
D SELF-SUFFICIENT 1 2 3 4 S 6 SOCIABLE
D STEADY 1 2 3 4 S S FLEXIBLE
D DOMINANT 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEFEEENTIAL
D CAUTIOUS 1 2 3 4 5 S BOLD
D UNINNISITED 1 2 3 4 S 1
SELF-CONTROLLED
D CONSCIENTIOUS X 2 ) 4 S S
HAffY-OO-LUCKY
*
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*••****• )fm flltttl m  you think ho or oho will ho fiv
situation
v m  MOOtAATSLY SORB- SONS* 
MUCH AftLltS NRAT KRAY 
Amiss Amiss Amiss
HOOSftATBLY VSRY
MUCH
A m iss
S8R10US
SVSJSCTZVB 1
0
0 
0 
D 
9
9 OlORIfl®
9. bsaustic  
9 
9
D QVIBT 
9 CUMTIVATBp
I
I
I
s
s
s
I
I
I
I
s
rw-LOVIRa
ANALYTIC
CASUAL
ZDSALZSTIC
NATURAL
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DEPENDS VERY ON THE MUCH SITUATION APPLIES
MODERATELYAPPLIES SOME- SOME­WHAT WHAT APPLIES APPLIES
MODERATELYAPPLIES VERYMUCHAPPLIES
D SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 S S
TOUGH- MINDED
D SELF-SUFFICIENT 1 2 3 4 5 I
•
SOCIABLE
D STEADY 1 2 3 4 S s FLEXIBLE
D DOMINANT I 2 3 4 5 1 DEFERENTIAL
D CAUTIOUS l 2 3 4 S « BOLD
D UNINHIBITED 1 2 3 4 S s SELF*CONTROLLED
D CONSCIENTIOUS 1 2 3 4 S s
HAPPY*OO-LUCKY
